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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(c) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a circuit court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In this 
case, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Judge, Third Judicial 
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered a 
final judgment and conviction against Mr. Frank Joseph Irish for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, and 
Making an Improper Lane Change, an infraction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial Court reversibly err in reprimanding Mr. 
Irish in the presence of the jury for arriving to Court late? 
2. Was enough evidence presented by the prosecution from 
which reasonable persons could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr, Irish had committed the offense of driving under the 
influence of alcohol? 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
TEXT OF ORDINANCES 
-'-24-10') DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND 
INTOXICANTS, 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this city if 
the person has a blood or breath alcohol content 
of .08 percent or greater by weight as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this 
city. 
12.4-1 .il») - j LANED ROADWAY DRIVING PROCEDURES 
MOTORCYCLE RULES. 
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or 
more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the 
following rules in addition to all others 
consistent herewith shall apply: 
A, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as 
practicable entirely within a single lane, and 
shall not be moved from such lane or across a 
lane line without giving the right-of-way to 
vehicles in the lane to be entered, nor until the 
driver has first ascertained that such movement 
can be made with safety and such driver has given 
the signal prescribed in Section 12.44.140 of 
this chapter, or its successor. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff 
• v. 
FRANK JOSEPH IRISH, 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence of; "\ 1 >:oliu I , .1 •• J.,\ y,\ \\ misdemeanor, in violation of Salt 
Lake City Revised Ordinance Section 12-24-100, and Making an 
Improper Lane Change, an infraction, in violation of Salt Lake City 
Revised Ordinance Sectuui 1 /, --; I MJIJ, in I UP 7'iird Judicial Circuit 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
ROIJ*-M «' 'i i vi nqfst-on, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1
 <° at- about 10: J1' , m. , Frank Joseph Irish 
picked up a friend x\ . J;..:;. "ounge, '*< » , From the lounge, 
Mr. Irish drove his friend to the friend's home. (Tr. 95). While 
a1" fh(i l i" 1^ 1,1* h »m<-\, " , l,,ri,,!, had one beer '**•. j •. . . _r. Irish 
had not consumed any alcohol prior b j . 
About a half in ho-;:; after Mr. Irish had the one beer, Mr. 
Irish dii'i liL/i 1." f i»-
 ; Ming westbound on North Temple. 
Case No. 880536-CA 
Priority No. 2 
(Tr. 97). Mr. Irish stopped his vehicle to wait for a green light 
at the intersection at 800 West and North Temple. (Tr. 98) While at 
this intersection Mr. Irish and his friend engaged in a heated 
argument causing Mr. Irish to not see the light turn green until 
about three quarters of the way through the green light cycle. (Tr. 
98,50,51). Officer Mickey Paul testified that as Mr. Irish moved 
through the intersection he moved towards the right lane. (Tr. 51) 
There was a heavy flow of traffic that evening. (Tr. 97) Officers 
Paul and Kirk activated their red and blue flashing lights and 
sirens. (Tr. 53) 
Mr. Irish saw this and slowly moved to the right lane to 
make way for the officers. (Tr. 53,97) There is a dispute in the 
evidence as the officers testified Mr. Irish did not use his signal 
when changing lanes as Mr. Irish testified he did use his signal. 
(Tr. 51-53, 97,98). 
Officer Paul spoke with Mr. Irish and noticed a odor of 
alcohol coming from the car. (Tr. 55) Officer Paul noticed there 
was also a passenger in the car (Tr. 72) The passenger was drunk 
and there was an odor of alcohol about him. (Tr. 99) 
Officer Paul questioned Mr. Irish and asked him to submit 
himself to a field sobriety test. (Tr. 58). Throughout the field 
sobriety test, Mr. Irish was very belligerent and constantly made 
fun of the tests. (Tr. 63-68) 
Mr. Irish was placed under arrest by Officer Paul and 
requested to submit to a chemical test, the intoxylizer. (Tr. 68). 
Mr. Irish refused to submit to the test because he was concerned 
about the nte":1ization OL f-" -.-^ ^ .' T-: ( - •  - 35,36). 
Throughout t;v> •::/. :re Mmp, • .... . ,j - ent. (Tr. 
85,86). 
A OULL. took a recess at noon . "* when 
the trial resumed again, the jury was seated in the : - *. • at 
defense counsel and **ir ' rish were not preset :y --.,46). The 
H o n o r a b ] e R o g e i: - * .r/ fur. s t a r t i n g 
late and informed them that f v :ri^: A . ••-oceid "without any 
interruption whatsoever, ?xce^ -"or l-h- fa :t t ^  a t- our defendant and 
defense i <, r • - ? " Ti: 16 ) The 
following exchange too*, place ; •; t.he jury's presence. This is taken 
from pages 46 througu 4d of the trial transcript. 
, JUDGE: This afternoon took a little longer than what we 
anticipated, bi i1 a11 that is ironed out and we'11 
be able to proceed with the trial now without any 
interruption whatsoever, except for the fact that 
our defendant and defense counsel will be coming 
in just momentarily. 
PROSECUTION: The record should reflect that at present 
time defendant and no counsel are present. 
JUDGE: I'm sorry. 
PROSECUTION: The record should reflect that at the 
present time neither defendant nor counsel are 
present 
JUDGE: That's correct, defense counsel was instructed to 
return with the defendant. 
PROSECUTION: iMay I approach a moment? 
CONVERSAT.; \1 THE BENCH 
JUDGE: It is now 10 minutes after 2:00 and we're ready 
to begin again trial in this matter of Salt Lake 
City v. Frank Irish. The City is prepared to 
proceed and have your first witness present, is 
that correct? 
PROSECUTION: Yes. 
JUDGE: The record should further reflect that Mr. Loyd, 
counsel for the defendant, is present. The 
defendant has absented himself from the 
courtroom, the court has allowed defense counsel 
some time in an effort to locate his client, we 
will proceed in this point in absentia proceeding 
until he, in fact, does appear. I've also 
instructed the security from the court -----
Mr. Irish, I want you to come up here and sit at 
this table and I am instructing you by order of 
this court that you are not to leave this 
courtroom unless and until you are so authorized 
by this court. Why don't you sit over there next 
to your counsel. Do you understand what I'm 
saying to you.? 
MR. IRISH: Yes, sir. 
Further on in the trial, the Court takes one more recess 
before the jury retires to reach a verdict. (Tr. 107). Again in 
the jury's presence, Judge Livingston states, "And Mr. Loyd , will 
you stay with your client?" (Tr. 107). 
The jury subsequently returns with a verdict of guilty of 
all three counts. (Tr. 118). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Frank Joseph Irish's rights to a fair and impartial 
trial were violated when the trial judge reprimanded him in the 
jury's presence. The error was prejudicial to Mr. Irish. 
The City failed to present a sufficient quantity of 
evidence to support a conviction for Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol. 
- 4 -
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REPRIMANDING APPELLANT IN THE JURY'S PRESENCE 
WHEN HE ARRIVED AFTER THE TRIAL COMMENCED. 
Both the United States and Utah roisf. i--utions provide that 
- , :- , • : •. • t :) 1 : e t r i ed b] - an 
impartial and fai r jury of his peers. This right to a fair trial i 
jealously protected and is essential to the proper functioning of 
our system, of criminal justice. 
The judge plays a critical role in this endeavor to ensure 
en- • , -p 5 -reives a fair trial. State v. Pokini, 526 P. 2d 94 
^•i. I*"? Therefore, it is essential that the trial judge not 
only r.e rota 1./ indifferent as between the parties, but must also 
^;r- - - i )£ I : =i:i I i• :j ; 3o . Kinna _v. St.ate , 4 47 P . 2( 3 32 (1: Jev . 
1968). 
To project this appearance of impartiality, the judge must 
b e e x t i: e m e 1 y c a r e f i I 1 a, 3 t : :) 'v 11 1 a t 1 1 < * s a y s < :> r d o e s b e c a u s e t h e j i 11:;; r 
looks to the judge as their guide and guardian. Ij3. at 35. The 
influence the trial judge has on the jury is great and the lightest 
w o r d :> r :i 1 11 i m i d a t i o n i 3 received the j u 1: y w i 11 1 d eference a 1 1 d may 
prove controlling. Querela v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 
(1963). 
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted on March 1, 
1974, by all the courts of justice in Utah provides in part: 
A judge should be patient, dignified and 
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, 
lawyers, and others who come before the court . . 
Canon 1 of the same Code also provides that a judge "should 
exhibit conduct which promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary". 
The judge plays a critical role in the judicial process. 
When the judge's conduct, regardless of whether such conduct was 
intentional or not, brings to question the fairness of an 
individual's trial, the court must give the accused the benefit of 
the doubt and order a new trial. 
The United States Supreme Court has set a standard by which 
it can determine if the error is harmful so as to warrant a new 
trial. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 (1967); Fahy v. 
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). Pursuant to this standard, 
the error is harmful "if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
matter complained of might have contributed to the conviction." 
State v. Pokini, 526 P.2d at 101, quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 
U.S. at 86-87. That is, the error must be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt otherwise the error merits a reversal. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. at 24. 
In this case, the City had 3 witnesses. All three 
witnesses were police officers. The defense had only one witness, 
the defendant. The testimony given by the officers, for the most 
p a i: t , , 31 1 a r j: • 1 y c o rtf ] i c t e 3 w 11 h 11 i e t e s t :i in o i v • < :) f 11 I e d e f e n d a n t T h e 
defense's case depended for t ;ve .nosl c:.-^: M the credibility of the 
defendant. This was a typical case -^f who the ury b^liev-i and 
w h e n I nf.j judy>- i »*huk"'i I . >e 
defense, this is prejudicial e^or -an-: *ej aires a reversal. 
In
 S t a t e v. Pok . n i , '1 ,> ? . ^  i ^ : ' s. - "* i x *• n ^ t : ~; j u d g e 
rebuked defense counsel severa. *im-= * *: , - *.. The cour I: 
stated: 
A case of gui11 is never strong if evidence 
essential to conviction is the testimony of an 
alleged accomplice whose credibility the 
defendant subjects to severe attach. i^ d. at 102. 
In c h e " vor:* vh-j •  - the defense's case depends for the 
- . . , , - ^ - < • > • . - * - i . - • • * - ^ 
a key witness, any remarks by the judge that may have diminished 
counsel's efficacy in the eyes of the jury is prejudicial error :d. 
at 
Certainly, if remarks fay the trial judge to defense counsel 
1,1
 S f U e v. P o k i n i is pre judicial error then remarks to the 
defendant; as in this case must also be prejudicial error. Aft .er 
all, the principal person whose credibility is at question in any 
trial is the defendant. It is difficult enough to keep the jury 
focused on the concept of presumption of innocence without the judge 
making remarks that portray the defendant as an irresponsible, 
i :ii: 11 i:i ist wort h ] • :i  t i« 3:ii ; idi ia.1 w 1 io mi lst 1 ::>e r e p e a t e d 1 y o r d e r e d •: .- r e m a i n 
the courtroom with his attorney every time the Court takes a 
- 7 -
recess. (Tr. 107). As the Court in State v. PokinL stated, the 
trial judges short-tempered remarks in the presence of the jury, 
exacerbated by repetition, "cling to the mind like a tattoo on the 
epidermis." I_d. at 104, quoting Carlile v. State, L76 So. 862, 864 
(1937). 
It seems in this case, that the Judge had a number of 
alternatives available to him. The Judge could have waited for a 
moment when the jury was not in the courtroom to inquire of Mr. 
Irish why he was late and reprimand him for being late. The Judge 
may have also kept the jury out until he was ready to commence the 
trial without the defendant's presence and limit his remarks to the 
fact that the defendant was not present and admonish the jury that 
this should not affect their decision as to the defendant's guilt or 
innocence. 
Instead, the Judge permitted the jury to sit in the court 
room while defense counsel attempted to locate the defendant and 
then instructed the jury that the delay was because the defendant 
was not present and the Court would proceed anyway. Furthermore, 
the judge states in the jury's presence that he has instructed the 
Court security to do something about the matter.(Tr. 48). Part way 
through this instruction, the defendant enters the Court room and 
the judge in a stern tone orders the defendant not to leave the 
Court room without permission. All this takes place in the jury's 
presence. 
This conduct by the judge is prejudicial error as he should 
have excused the jury before reprimanding the defendant. Dale v. 
State, 441 P.2d 476 (Okl 1968) 
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POINT TT 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AGAINST MR. IRISH, 
The standard employed for reviewing the sufficiency of 
evidence and nAv»-M" n. mi i jimi - ^ ir.; -• - - ^  "-'at e 
v, Petree, 659 P.2d 44 j, 444 (Utah 198:/, :he "ran Supreme Cou't 
stated, "[Njo* withstanding ' :i- presumptior ^vor )f the jury's 
decision thi - r * •• * . • • *:-*. * 
the evidence to support the verdict * -'ur-'ie" :e Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. Ij3. at 444. 
T h e Z :> i 11: t I: i a, 3 a < 3 o p t e < 3 i 1 i e v e r i s - a rn « 3 s t a n d a r d for reviewing 
cases for sufficiency of evidence. State v. Garcia, 744 p.2d 1029, 
1030 (Utah App. 1987). This standard restates the due process 
• . .. . - ^  * '^  r case except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. Jackson 
\ « Virginia/ M 1 n ii'i1-!^ L n i •> U n s h i p , 3'+ ' i.S. 353 
( 1 9 7 0 ) . 
The City necessarily must have proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt each element of Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances Section. 
That ordinance reads: 
12.24.100 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND 
INTOXICANTS 
A. 1. It is unlawful and punishable as provided 
in this section for any person to operate or be 
in physical control of a vehicle within this city 
if the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
content of .08 percent or greater byweight as 
shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical control, 
or if the person under the influence of alcohol 
or any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
or any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this 
city. 
Mr. Irish urges that the evidence introduced to support the 
allegation that he was under the influence of alcohol or drug 
rendering him incapable of safely driving a vehicle was insufficient 
and that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to the efficacy of that particular element. 
The evidence introduced by the City to support this element 
consisted of testimony by a police officer who stated that Mr. Irish 
was weaving, driving too slow, did not stop as soon as he should 
have, had an odor of alcohol about him, failed the field sobriety 
tests and was extremely belligerent. 
The defense provided a reasonable explanation to each of 
these allegation. First, Mr. Irish stated that he was engrossed in 
a heated argument with the passenger thereby causing him not to see 
the light turn green and driving slow. 
Secondly, Mr. Irish testified, and the officer's testimony 
verified, that there was a passenger in the vehicle who was close to 
"passed out" drunk. The odor of alcohol was therefore quite 
prevalent. 
Thirdly, Mr. Irish, and the officer's testimony verified 
that Mr. Irish was extremely belligerent and uncooperative during 
the field sobriety tests. For example, during the handslap test, 
Mr. Irish refused to follow the officer's instructions and instead 
recited "pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake". 
Mr. Irish's conduct can be interpreted as conduct by one 
who is intoxicated. However, it is more the conduct of one who 
dislikes the authority of police officers and refuses to submit to 
any display of such authority. This causes reasonable doubt as to 
whether Mr. Irish was intoxicated or simply a very unpleasant person. 
Accordingly, the requisite element of intoxication is 
suspect, and reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Irish committed the crime of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. This Court should so find and vacate the 
conviction entered against Mr. Irish. 
- 11 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the appellant, Mr. 
Frank Joseph Irish, requests this Court reverse his convictions for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and making an improper lane 
change and remand this case with an order for either a new trial or 
a dismissal of the charge. 
Respectfully submitted this « day of May, 1989. IF* 
yu~J 
Vernice S. Ah Ching J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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